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Abstract. In the theory of argumentation, not only legal argumentation but 
argumentation in general, one can distinguish between two positions towards 
the role of beliefs of the participants of the dispute. According to the first 
position, beliefs of the agents do not and should not play a significant role in 
argumentation. Argumentation is understood as an activity the goal of which is 
to not to reach an agreement at the level of beliefs but at the level of 
commitments of the agents. Conversely, according to the second position, the 
agreement should be reached at the level of beliefs not at the level of 
commitments of the agents. Supporting this position is the assumption that 
agreement at the level of commitment is to weak of a condition to settle an 
argument. 
In the first part of this paper it will be claimed that the latter position is more 
convincing than the former, i.e. in an argument agreement should be reached at 
the level of beliefs, not at the level of commitments. However, as it will be 
claimed in the second part of the paper, this position rests on a strong 
assumption about the rationality of belief formation and revision.  The 
implausibility of this assumption will be pointed in the third part of the paper, in 
the context of different failures of rationality. In the last part of the paper, an 
explanation of this assumption will be proposed which will point to the solution 
of this problem. It will be argued that this assumption can be supported by a 
certain view about the psychology of the agents. 
In the last part of the paper, an explanation of this assumption will be 
proposed which will point to the solution of this problem. It will be argued that 
this assumption can be supported by a certain view about the psychology of the 
agents. 
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1. Commitments and beliefs in argumentation 
Commitment is a normative concept. Normativity of commitment 
boils down to the fact that it involves certain obligations of the agent 
who makes the commitment. In the context of argumentation these 
obligations can be identified with the rules governing the argumentative 
process. For instance, if an agent claims that p she is committed to what 
p entails, committed to rejecting what is inconsistent with p, or 
committed to rejecting p in the light of prevailing evidence against p. 
These commitments are incurred on the agent whenever she enters an 
argument. 
Belief, on the other hand, is, first and foremost, a psychological 
notion. It is a propositional attitude which, on a standard account,  
consists of an attitude (believing) and the content of the attitude (what 
is believed). The psychological character of the attitude boils down to 
the fact that when a person believes that p she takes the proposition p 
to be true. The content of belief that p is the proposition p. Furthermore, 
the standard account assumes that there are properties in the real world 
which correspond beliefs. These properties can be understood as 
dispositions to behave in a certain way or dispositions to form other 
beliefs. Also, they can be understood as relations between the agent and 
her mental representations, or as mental states which perform a certain 
function in producing the behavior or other mental states of the agent. 
Beliefs of the agent, therefore, are understood to play a crucial role in 
the action of the agent. 
There is an important difference between commitment and belief. For 
instance, despite the fact that the agent who claims that p is committed, 
for instance, to accepting what p entails it is certainly not the case that 
she always believes what she claims, or that she believes what is 
entailed by what she claims. For example, agent can claim that p while 
holding beliefs inconsistent with p for prudential reasons. 
Interesting examples of situations when commitments and beliefs of 
the participants in a dispute come apart were proposed in a recent 
paper by David Godden. In these situations, despite verbal agreement, 
the beliefs of the agents remain inconsistent. Such situations include:  
 
1. A situation when the acceptable information or legitimate moves 
available to an arguer is limited by the rules of the discussion itself. 
2. A situation when disputant feels that she is not skilled enough to 
argue effectively against her opponent even though she thinks that his 
position is flawed, or 
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3. A situation when disputant feels that she is not knowledgeable 
enough to produce countervailing evidence even though she may believe 
that it exists.  
4. A situation when disputant feels that the reasons disputed in the 
argument do not address her real reasons for holding her position1. 
 
Both commitments and beliefs seem to play a significant role in 
argumentation. The role of commitment is straightforward: 
commitments are incurred by the rules of argumentation, and without 
complying with these rules one cannot hope for a rational resolution of 
the dispute. If the agents decide to settle the difference of opinions by 
means of an argument, they will incur on themselves the commitments 
which are correlated with the rules of argumentation. However, beliefs 
also seem to play a significant role in argumentation. If the participants 
in an argument reach the agreement at the level of commitments 
without reaching the agreement at the level of beliefs, the achieved 
agreement can be described as merely provisional. The agreement will 
last only as long as the argument. In such situations, despite the 
conclusion of the argument, the beliefs of the agents remain unchanged. 
Previous considerations make it interesting to investigate the 
consequences of neglecting belief in argumentation. For such 
investigation it is important to point out the characteristics of the 
models of argumentation which emphasize the role of commitment in 
argumentation at the expense of belief. Goddard plausibly claims that 
the models of argumentation which underline the role of commitment in 
argumentation est on the following assumptions: 
 
Assumption 1: The goal of persuasive argumentation is to settle a 
difference of opinion by rational means. 
Assumption 2: Commitment and belief are logically and causally 
independent. A change in one does not always result in a corresponding 
change in the other. 
Assumption 3: A difference of opinion is resolved when the 
commitments of the disputants have reached a state of agreement with 
respect to the claim at issue2.            
                                             
                                          
1 D. GODDEN, The Importance of Belief in Argumentation: Belief, Commitment 
and the Effective Resolution of a Difference of Opinion, in: Synthese, 172, 3, 
2010, p. 406. 
2 Ivi, p. 405 
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Godden argues3 that these assumptions can be found at least in the 
three following models of argumentation: the formal dialectics of 
Hamblin4, the contemporary dialectical theory of Walton and Krabbe5, 
and the Pragma-Dialectical theory of van Eemeren and Grootendost6. 
These plausible considerations will not be in the scope of the following 
analysis. What is more interesting are the unwelcome consequences of 
the fact that these models rest on the three above-mentioned 
assumptions.  
According to Godden, the main objection against these models boils 
down to the fact that they: 
 
 
“fail by their own standards to be effective normative models of 
argumentation. (...) I take it as a paradigm of failure when an arguer 
concedes a position in argumentation and yet proceeds to act as if no 
such concession had been made. That is, I take argumentation to 
have failed if the results of argumentation are not effective in shaping 
the future actions of arguers. In such a situation (...) the goal of 
argumentation has not been achieved7”. 
 
 
The goal of argumentation presupposed by these models, as it was 
already mentioned, is to settle the difference of opinion by rational 
means. According to Godden, one cannot hope to settle the difference of 
opinion by rational means at the level of commitment. Agreement at the 
level of commitments still allows for acting as if no such agreement had 
been made. To authentically settle the difference of opinion after the 
conclusion of the argument agents should act accordingly to what they 
agreed on. This can be achieved only when the conflict between the 
beliefs of the agents had been resolved. 
On the other hand, theories of argumentation which underline the 
role of belief rest only on the first of the above-mentioned assumptions. 
According to the first assumption, it is still correct to describe these 
theories as understanding the goal of persuasive argumentation to be a 
                                          
3 Ivi, p. 407. 
4 CH. HAMBLIN, Fallacies, Newport News, Vale Press, VA, 1970. 
5 D. WALTON, E, KRABBE, Commitment in Dialogue: Basic Concepts of 
Interpersonal Reasoning, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1995.  
6 F.H. VAN EEMEREN and R. GROOTENDORST, Speech Acts in Argumentative 
Discourse, Foris, Dordrecht, 1984; F.H. VAN EEMEREN and R. GROOTENDORST, A 
Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The Pragma-Dialectical Approach, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.   
7 D. GODDEN, The Importance, cit., p. 405. 
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settling a difference of opinion by rational means. This assumption does 
not presuppose whether the agreement of the participants of the 
argument should be reached at the level of beliefs, or at the level of 
commitments. It only points to the fact that the agreement should be 
reached according to the rules of rationality. The second assumption in 
the context of belief-based model of argumentation will be discussed 
later. It will be argued that for the belief-based model of argumentation 
to hold, it should presuppose a certain relation between rational 
commitments of the agents and their beliefs. The third assumption, the 
assumption about the resolution of the conflict at the level of 
commitments, obviously does not apply to this approach. This approach 
underlines that the resolution of the conflict is reached when the beliefs 
of the agents are in a state of agreement to the claim at issue. 
 
 
2. Commitments and beliefs in legal argumentation 
The above-mentioned goal of argumentation, namely reaching an 
agreement at the level of beliefs, certainly seems adequate to many 
kinds of discourse. Especially in the ordinary, everyday discourse mere 
verbal agreement seems not enough to settle the difference of opinion. 
If, after the conclusion of the dispute and settling the difference of 
opinion, agents act as if no such dispute took place, it is difficult to claim 
that the argument was successful. The reason of this is that in many 
kinds of discourse there are no appropriate means of coercion to make 
agents to behave accordingly to the results of the discourse. In such 
discourse the only means of coercion available are, perhaps, some social 
sanctions. Non-legal sanctions tend to be, however, diffused and 
ineffective. Obviously, there is no catalogue of such sanctions and, 
furthermore, these sanctions have an unwelcome property of being to a 
great extent applied unequally across the members of the society.  
The situation seems to be different in the area of legal 
argumentation. The rules of legal argumentation are supported with 
concentrated sanctions which can enforce acting in accordance to the 
result of the legal dispute. Despite the agents not reaching an 
agreement at the level of beliefs, reaching it at the level of 
commitments in legal argument can be claimed to be enough of a 
condition for the legal dispute to be effective. It would not be prudent 
for the agents in a legal argument to reach a verbal agreement 
(commitment-level agreement) and still act as if no such agreement had 
been made. Legal sanctions seem to ensure that the actions of the 
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agents after resolution of the legal argument will be in accordance to the 
agreement at the commitment-level. 
Although reaching an agreement at the level of beliefs seems to be a 
somewhat less significant condition for the success of legal 
argumentation, one can point ot the fact that in many cases beliefs still 
play an important role in this kind of discourse. For instance, the 
judgments of a court usually bind only the parties involved in the case 
at hand. Even if the parties do not agree with the judgment (the 
resolution of a legal argument) at the belief level, legal sanctions can be 
applied if they do not act in accordance to the judgment. It is desirable 
for such an argumentation, however, to bind also other judges in similar 
cases, especially if the case at hand has been settled in a higher court. 
Nevertheless, in legal systems where there is no doctrine of precedent 
such judgments will not formally bind other judges in similar cases. 
They can act (judge) as if no such judgment has been made, despite the 
fact that, arguably, they are also participants of a legal argumentation. 
The situation would be different if there was an agreement at the level 
of belief between the agents participating in a legal dispute. In such 
situation, the actions of the agents should correspond to each other, at 
least ceteris paribus, just as their beliefs correspond. Another example, 
indicated by Godden, includes legislative argumentation which results in 
the passing of a statute8. Despite the fact that the statute is binding 
across the society, it can be invalidated by the Supreme Court. It can 
happen, for instance, when the beliefs of the members of the Supreme 
Court are inconsistent with the beliefs of the participants of a legislative 
argumentation.  
 
 
3. A problem for the belief-based model of argumentation  
The above-mentioned claims underlining the role of belief in 
argumentation are plausible because of the role of belief in action. On a 
standard, belief-desire model of action, agents act in accordance with 
possessed beliefs and desires9. Desires and beliefs of the agents are 
understood to be the causes of behavior. Agents possessing conflicting 
beliefs will, therefore, act differently. Commitments of the agents are 
not, on the other hand, causes of behavior. Of course, one can have a 
reason to act accordingly to the incurred commitment, e.g. when he 
                                          
8 Ivi, p. 411. 
9 D. DAVIDSON, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, in: D: DAVIDSON, Essays on 
Actions and Events, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, pp. 3-20. 
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possesses a corresponding belief. However, on their own, commitments 
cannot assure the outcome of the action.  
If, after the conclusion of the argument, the actions of the agents are 
still not consistent, one can plausibly argue that the goal of the 
argument had not been achieved. After all, settling the different 
opinions of the agents is not only verbal matter, but also a psychological 
one. In the case of such discrepancies between actions, even when 
participants in an argument agree at the level of commitment, one can 
plausibly state that the difference of opinion had not been really settled.   
Despite its plausibility in underlining the role of belief in 
argumentation, this approach, as it was mentioned, still rests on the 
assumption that the goal of the persuasive argument is to reach an 
agreement by rational means. However, if the agreement is understood 
to be at the level of beliefs, it follows that agents are taken to be 
capable to revise their beliefs according to the rules of rationality. This is 
certainly a strong assumption about the rationality of the agents 
participating in an argument. If we take the agents to be capable to 
revise their beliefs according to the commitments incurred by the rules 
of the argumentation which are taken to be rational, we take the agents 
not only as being able to notice such rules but also as being able to be 
motivated by such rules when they notice them. On this account the 
agents are capable not only to be responsive to rules of rationality but, 
furthermore, revise their beliefs according to such rules. There are, 
however, many examples of the agents failing to to track such rules and 
failing to revise their beliefs in the above-mentioned manner. An 
example of the former is hyperbolic discounting, which is a time 
inconsistent mode of discounting. This phenomenon consists in agents 
preferring the sooner albeir smaller reward to a greater reward which 
will be received later10. An example of the latter is self-deception. It is a 
phenomenon when the agent holds certain beliefs despite the fact of 
strong evidence contrary to this belief. These examples justify the 
statement that agents are only partially rational in their action and belief 
revision11. It would seem, therefore, that the assumption that the 
agents can track the rational rules of argumentation and revise their 
beliefs accordingly is an example of moralistic fallacy, when it is 
assumed that what agents ought to do corresponds to what agents 
really do. 
                                          
10 G. AINSLIE, Breakdown of Will, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2004, pp. 28-33. 
11 An interesting account of partial rationality of the agents can be found in 
W. ZAŁUSKI, Evolutionary Theory and Legal Philosophy, Edward Elgar, London, 
2009. 
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Godden seems to acknowledge this difficulty. In a footnote to his 
paper he makes a following provision to the claim that the 
argumentation fails when it is not effective in shaping the future actions 
of the agent: 
 
 
“I wish to exclude cases of cognitive failures (e.g., the arguer simply 
forgets what was conceded in the argument), cases of ‘moral’ failures 
(e.g., akrasia), and cases where the arguer re-thinks the issue (even 
only a few moments later) and comes to a different view or simply 
changes her mind. All of these can occur without the type of failure I 
imagine here. The type of failure I imagine here comes from ignoring 
or flaunting the responsibilities incurred in the process of 
argumentation. For argumentation to be effective in shaping the 
future action of the arguers, they must take proper account of its 
results in their practical and theoretical reasoning insofar as they are 
able”12. 
 
 
The assumption of the belief-based model of argumentation is, 
therefore, that agents are able to take proper account of the results of 
the argument in their practical and theoretical reasoning. Obviously 
there are situations when the agents fail to do so, which include not only 
situations mentioned by Goddard but also many others, including 
hyperbolic discounting and self-deception. However, these situation 
should be rare enough for the belief-based models of argumentation to 
hold. If the agents do not possess the ability to track the results of 
argumentation and revise their beliefs accordingly, one could have little 
hope to settle the differences of opinion at the level of beliefs. The 
agents must possess such a capacity for the belief-based model of 
argumentation to be plausible. However, there is prevailing evidence 
coming from many fields of science that rational capacities of humans 
are too limited to expect them to track and to follow the rules of 
rationality in many situations13. This presents a problem for the belief-
                                          
12 D. GODDEN, The importance, cit., p. 405. 
13 Apart from hyperbolic discounting and self-deception one could point to 
one of the most popular experimental paradigm in experimental psychology, the 
Wason selection task. In these experiments agents systematically fail to utilize a 
simple rule of inference, namely modus tollens (J. TOOBY, L. COSMIDES Cognitive 
Adaptations for Social Exchange in: J. BARKOW et al. The Adapted Mind, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1992, pp. 163-228). Other examples of failures of 
rationality include errors in reasoning under uncertainty, a topic which was 
extensively researched on by Daniel Kahnemann and Amos Tversky (D. 
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based model of argumentation due to the fact that agents do not seem 
do possess the capacities required for the argumentation to be effective, 
i.e. to revise their beliefs accordingly to the conclusion of the argument 
and to act in accordance with the revised beliefs. Or even if they do, this 
capacity is limited at least to some extent. 
 
 
4. Personal and subpersonal level of psychological explanation  
The plausibility of the belief-based model of argumentation requires, 
therefore, a much stronger link between rational commitments incurred 
on the participants in an argumentation and their beliefs than the link 
(or even a complete lack of it) between commitments and beliefs in 
commitment-based models. Many examples of the failures of rationality 
make any proposal of such a strong link problematic. There is, however, 
a way to evade this objection which is connected to a certain 
understanding of the psychology of the agents. 
Despite the fact that the belief-based model of argumentation rests 
on the assumption about agents possessing certain rational capacities 
which is, at least to some extent, undermined by empirical science, the 
defense of this model of argumentation can appeal to a rational 
interpretation by the agent of other agents, in terms of them having 
beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. The basic assumption about the agents 
on this view is quite simple: to understand other person is to rationalize 
her, i.e. to assign her a set of propositional attitudes (such as beliefs, 
desires, or intentions) which will make her as rational as possible. It is 
argued that whenever we attribute propositional attitudes to other 
agents when trying to explain their behavior, we do not have any other 
possibility of doing so except to understand them as agents which do 
have the capacity to track and to follow rules of rationality. This kind of 
explanation can be described as personal explanation14. On the other 
hand, explanation of behavior which does not utilize the assumption 
about the rational attribution of propositional attitudes can be described 
as subpersonal explanation15.  
                                                                                                         
KAHNEMANN, A. TVERSKY Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in: 
Science, 185, 4157, pp. 1124-1131).  More familiar examples of failures in 
rationality involve leaping to conclusions and wishful thinking.  
14 Perhaps a more familiar name for this kind of explanation would be to 
commonsense explanation, or folk psychological explanation. 
15 The distinction between personal and sub-personal levels in understanding 
the mind was introduced by Daniel Dennett (D. DENNETT, Content and 
Consciousness, Routledge, London, 1969, p. 93). 
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At the subpersonal level of explanation it is appropriate to explain the 
behavior of the agents as a result of the operation of mental, or 
biological mechanisms. Mechanism is the view that the behavior of the 
agents and mental phenomena connected with it can be explained in 
terms of the functioning and the organization of the parts of the agents 
mind, and/or brains16. This kind of explanation is characteristic to 
neuroscience, and, arguably, to cognitive science17. Obviously, this kind 
of explanation does not need to invoke rationalization of agents in order 
to explain their behavior. 
Furthermore, the view which assumes the irreducibility of the rational 
component in the explanation of behavior proposes a radical 
discontinuity between personal and subpersonal levels of explanation. 
Despite the fact that empirical sciences reveal, for instance, regularities 
of behavior and reasoning which do not correspond to the assumption 
about the rationality of the agents, from the viewpoint of personal 
explanation, to understand other agents is still to take them as rational 
beings. This kind of explanation omits the descriptive aspect of how 
people really behave or reason, and focuses on the normative aspect of 
how they should behave, or reason. The normative aspect plays a 
crucial role in the explanation at the personal level.   
The assumption about the rationality of agents, which is a necessary 
condition of understanding agents at the personal level of explanation, 
is, obviously, only an idealization. The proponents of this view realize it, 
but despite this rationality is understood on this view as inherent in this 
kind of explanation. One of the proponents of this account, Daniel 
Dennett, claims:  
 
 
However rational we are, it is the myth of our rational agenthood that 
structures and organizes our attributions of beliefs and desires to 
others and that regulates our own deliberations and investigations. 
We aspire to rationality, and without the myth of rationality the 
concepts of belief and desire would be uprooted. Folk psychology, 
then, is idealized in that it produces its predictions and explanations 
by calculating in a normative system; it predicts what we will believe, 
                                          
16 C. CRAVER, Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of 
Science, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, pp. 2-8. 
17 An example of a mechanism utilized by cognitive science is a mental 
module. The assumption about the mind here is that, at least partially, mind is 
constituted of different mental modules. Behaviour is explained by the 
functioning and the organization of these modules. 
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desire, and do, by determining what we ought to believe, desire, and 
do18. 
 
 
Elsewhere he claims that: 
 
 
“When considering what we ought to do, our reflections lead us 
eventually to a consideration of what we in fact do”19. 
 
 
This viewpoint, therefore, acknowledges that personal explanation is 
a rationalizing explanation, and rationalizing explanation implicates 
normative considerations. On this kind of explanation, to understand 
others the interpreter tries to make sense of their behavior by 
implementing in the explanation the normative rules of rationality. 
These rules do not describe the actual behavior or reasoning of the 
interpreted agents, but enable the interpreter to make sense of these 
phenomena. 
 The view described above proposes a very close connection between 
rational commitments of the agents and their propositional attitudes, 
such as belief. Understanding that others possess beliefs implicates 
understanding commitments which follow from possessing them such as 
believing what is entailed by explicated beliefs. On this account one can 
propose a solution to the above-mentioned problem for the belief-based 
model of argumentation. This problem consisted in the fact that there is 
a discontinuity between rational commitments incurred on the 
participants in the dispute and their beliefs. It was argued that often 
agents do not follow these commitments in forming and revising their 
beliefs. Because of that, one cannot hope to effectively resolve the 
dispute at the level of conflicting beliefs by rational means. However, 
the described account of the psychology of the disputants allows to 
                                          
18 D. DENNETT, The Intentional Stance, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1987, p. 
52. Similar accounts of the personal level of understanding other agents were 
proposed by other philosophers, including Donald Davidson (D. Davidson, 
Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980), John McDowell 
(J. MCDOWELL, Functionalism and Anomalous Monism, in: E. LEPORE and B. 
MCLAUGHLIN Actions and Events, Blackwell, Oxford, 1985), or Jennifer Hornsby (J. 
HORNSBY, Simplemindedness: in Defense of Naïve Naturalism in the Philosophy of 
Mind, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1997), or Alan Millar, (A. MILLAR, 
Understanding People. Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 2004). 
19 D. DENNETT, The Intentional Stance, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, p. 98. 
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accommodate this discrepancy. On this understanding, when we ascribe 
beliefs to others it is inevitable that we utilize normative considerations 
of what others should believe in. It is not a mistake, therefore, to think 
of beliefs as being shaped by rational commitments. Despite the fact 
that agents often do not meet this ideal, there is no other way of 
understanding them as having beliefs. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In the first part of the paper it was claimed that there are two 
positions towards the role of belief in argumentation. According to the 
commitment-based model of argumentation, it is not relevant what 
disputants believe in. It is only the commitments which are incurred on 
them by the argumentative process which are significant. According to 
the belief-based model of argumentation, it is at the level of beliefs that 
the disputants should reach an agreement to effectively resolve the 
dispute. It was argued, after Godden, that belief-based model of 
argumentation is a more plausible account of argumentation, including 
legal argumentation. However, in the second part of the paper a 
problem for this account of argumentation was described. The problem 
boils down to the fact that often it is questionable to expect the agents 
to form and to revise their beliefs in accordance to the results of the 
dispute. In the last part of the paper it was argued that one can propose 
a solution to this problem assuming that psychological explanation, at 
the personal level, is irreducibly rationalistic. 
